This week marks the six-month anniversary of the current US and Israeli military campaign against Iran. With the war stalemated, President Trump humiliated, and US military forces degraded and demoralised, Paul Rogers explores the causes and consequences of this latest in a long series of US military debacles.
Prior to the start of the Israeli/US war with Iran six months ago, the prospects for Benjamin Netanyahu’s government looked quite positive eight months before a general election in October. This was despite a conflict that had killed over 70,000 Palestinians in Gaza and buried many thousands more under rubble and wrecked buildings.
Moreover, the Likud-led government had reduced Gazans to the status of “human animals” after the Hamas assault on southern Israel more than two years previously. Polling even suggested that the majority of Israeli Jews supported ethnic cleansing, the enforced clearance of Palestinians, including those who currently have Israeli citizenship, to other countries.
War aims
In these circumstances, the Netanyahu government was keen to extend Israel’s security by neutralising Iran through regime termination and its replacement with acceptable secular rule, the destruction of any nuclear weapons ambitions and the substantial weakening of Iran’s conventional military power. As in their June 2025 ‘Operation Rising Lion’ aerial campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons development facilities, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) did not have the capability to do this without considerable support from the United States and. With Donald Trump in the White House, buoyed by his military’s successful intervention in Venezuela the previous month, Netanyahu was able to persuade him to make it a joint operation.
The plan was to start with the decapitation of the theocratic leadership and the most senior officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). That, it was hoped, would lead to a popular uprising, and US-Israeli air power would be ready to do maximum damage to armed forces that might act against that. Use of ground troops, Israeli or American, would be minimal and the operation was expected to be largely over within days.
US support was especially strong given the substantial influence that Netanyahu had over Trump, boosted by decades of antipathy between Iranians and the United States. That went right back to the termination of the elected Mossadegh government in a joint CIA/MI6 operation in 1953 and the restoration of the autocratic Shah as head of state.
There later followed the overthrow and exile of the Shah in the 1979 revolution and his replacement by a largely theocratic government under Ayatollah Khomeini, a period of instability that included a significant detention of numerous US diplomats and some family members for over a year.
That had a long-term impact on the US foreign policy community, made worse by the increasing Iranian influence in Iraq that followed the US-led coalition’s overthrow of Saddam Hussain in the 2003-11 invasion and occupation. For some in the US Republican Party, there may now have been concern over the risk of a protracted ground war with Iran but there was also a sense of unfinished business, given that it was one of the states making up George W Bush’s original “axis of evil” back in 2002.
For Iran, the minimal aim in a war initiated by Israel and the United States was the survival of the leadership. Anything more than that would be seen as a bonus, given the overwhelming military forces that could be brought against Iran by the two potential attackers.
The war and its early stages
The US and Israeli offensive started while talks over Iran’s nuclear programme were still in progress and was variously justified on the grounds of opposing the repression of public demonstrations, preventing the Iranian development of nuclear weapons and ensuring the stability of oil markets. Most independent security analysts and legal specialists were critical of the decision as being a clear violation of international law.
Israel and the US staged multiple air strikes on 28 February, the key aim being the assassination of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the killing of other religious and secular leaders. Some, including Ali Khamenei and his son and heir Mojtaba, were indeed killed or seriously injured on the first day, the Tehran regime having once again underestimated the military capabilities and the intelligence knowledge of the Israelis and Americans. That was one of the few mistakes it has made in the past six months. In any case, the regime did not collapse and little in the way of a public uprising followed.
What did become clear was that however much the regime and government was damaged it had planned for such an attack for many years so that an order of succession was pre-prepared and was rapidly implemented. As to the public uprising, US and Israeli analysis was plain wrong. There had certainly been large anti-government demonstrations earlier in the year, but these had been suppressed with force and loss of life.
Indeed, when the Ayatollah’s funeral was held, over four months after his assassination, it was a multi-day event across the country with massive crowds of support independently reported by foreign journalists in the country. Subsequently, and throughout the first six months of the war, open public opposition to the war was limited and when it did occur it was quickly suppressed.
As the conflict continued through the first month, primarily through airstrikes and with the United States playing the major role, a pattern emerged. This comprised further attempted assassinations together with multiple attacks on conventional military forces, especially the regular Iranian air and naval forces, which had many of their facilities destroyed or at least seriously damaged.
Both of these forces were relatively small for a country of 95 million people facing powerful regional and global opponents, but both Israel and the United States had badly underestimated the capabilities and resilience of the IRGC.
Getting it wrong
By late March, four weeks into the conflict, it was Iran that was the closest to achieving its war aims. Part of this was the extent to which the IRGC had long since become the main focus of Iranian security, including long-term practices of dispersal and duplication, and making effective use of armed and reconnaissance drones and other missiles.
Throughout the war there was concern over regional escalation, and not without reason. Along with the conflict with Iran, the IDF increased its military operations against Iran’s ally in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah, progressively occupying part of the country. Hezbollah, in turn, was able to fire missiles into northern Israel. Up to one-quarter of all Lebanese (1.2 million) and over 60,000 Israelis were forced to evacuate their homes as a result.
In Iran itself, an early decision was taken to use longer range missiles to target Israel in retaliation for the attacks by US-Israeli forces on and after 28 February. Somewhat surprisingly to many, Iran also began attacks on US bases and facilities in Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait.
Iran responded to criticism of this from the states concern by saying that Trump’s threat to destroy Iranian civilisation fully justified such action. While there was some retaliation from these states there was also concern at the ability of Iran to evade anti-missile defences, as the latter risked leading to a potential shortage of defensive systems.
Ceasefire and stalemate
By early April the war had reached an unstable stalemate, and a shaky two-week ceasefire was agreed from 8 April. This was in the context of Iran taking control of the Strait of Hormuz to impact oil and gas tanker exports sufficient to affect global oil prices. The United States initiated a retaliatory blockade of Iranian oil ports; talks mediated in Islamabad failed in mid-April but neither the United States nor Iran sought a potentially disastrous escalation. A notable and surprising feature of the talks was that they were almost entirely limited to the United States and Iran, with Israel scarcely involved.
A memorandum to end the war was eventually agreed on 17 June, but tensions escalated around the end of the month. 28 June saw a further pause in the attacks and the Pentagon declared the original operation, Epic Fury, ended on 07 July. In the event, that memorandum collapsed on 08 July.
After that, what was essentially a very violent stalemate developed rapidly and that remained the situation until late August. During Epic Fury, 417 US personnel were wounded and 14 killed. From 07 July to 21 August, 310 more were wounded and 4 more killed, an indication that this was very far from the end of the conflict.
On 24 August and in a change of approach, President Trump announced that Iran would be subject to an intense period of economic warfare until it negotiated a permanent ceasefire on US terms, but Iran responded that it could survive such an attack. Independent analysts took the view that what amounted to total economic warfare would only be possible with near-global support but China, the world’s second largest economy, made it clear within hours that it would not comply.
What now?
Reflecting on the conflict at the end of the first six months, there are several significant elements. The first is that Iran has faced down intense military action by the United States and Israel and, while undoubtedly taking many casualties and huge economic damage, it has survived.
Moreover, the conflict has had a direct impact on the global economy, including widespread inflationary pressures due to scarcity of oil, natural gas and fertiliser. This is having a disproportionate effect on poorer people on the margins, especially in import-dependent countries in the Middle East, East Africa and South East Asia. But there is also a more acute and massive economic impact on the US-aligned Gulf monarchies, whose hydrocarbon, tourism, business, trade and construction sectors have all been choked by Iranian attacks and blockade.
For Netanyahu and his government, the continuation of the war through to the 27 October election is viewed as politically valuable. From his perspective it can play to his advantage as the leader best placed to ensure stability given the substantial divisions within the parliamentary opposition.
For Trump, on the other hand, support for the war, as for Israel more generally, is decreasing and causing concern in Republican circles as the party faces losses in the 03 November mid-term elections. Thus, while the Israeli premier values continuation of hostilities until at least end of October, Trump is increasingly desperate for a deal to conclude hostilities well before November. Iran meanwhile, obstinately refuses to delink a deal with Washington from Israeli actions in Lebanon.
There are also vexed questions of military failures, one example being just a month into the war. On 27 March, Iran fired armed drones at US Air Force units exposed on the ground at the Prince Sultan Air Base in central Saudi Arabia. Ten US military personnel were wounded, two seriously, a key US Air Force aircraft, an E-3 Sentry command and control plane, was destroyed, and “multiple” KC-135 refuelling tankers were damaged. Other Iranian missile strikes in the early weeks of the war reportedly destroyed some of the United States’ most sophisticated and expensive air defence radar sites, in Qatar and Jordan.
More generally, senior officers in the Pentagon have exhibited a considerable degree of hubris, having great difficulty in accepting that Iran should even be seen as a serious opponent. Informed observers felt that much of this resulted from the policy of the ‘Secretary of War’, Pete Hegseth, in systematically replacing senior officers with those known to be strong supporters of Trump. Meanwhile, there are increasing signs of discontent and collapsing morale among US sailors and soldiers enduring indefinite deployments in austere conditions around Iran.
A second fault may have serious long-term consequences in that by underestimating the need for air defences, US forces have used anti-missile systems at a far greater rate than expected, depleting stocks at an alarming rate. Not only will that limit US defensive capabilities should the conflict with Iran intensify, it will also mean that there is little prospect of Ukraine getting the Patriot anti-missile units it needs, most likely extending the conflict with Russia and reducing the prospects for a negotiated end to that war.
In a multi-faceted conflict, there is one possibility of progress, since the United States and Iran both have reasons for seeking a way out, whatever they may say in public. The war is not going well for Trump and there may be sufficient people close to him “speaking truth to power” to convince him to accept a settlement. For the Tehran leadership, meanwhile, the current advantage for Iran, control of the Strait of Hormuz, is considerable but it will only take three years or so to open up new pipeline routes for oil exports from Gulf states. If both states can somehow present a mediated compromise as victory, and if Netanyahu and his allies can be warned against sabotaging a deal, then we may see serious progress to an end to the war.
The views and opinions expressed in posts on the Rethinking Security blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the network and its broader membership.
Image Credit: Emily J. Higgins, the White House via Flickr. President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance and others attend the repatriation of remains of six US soldiers killed in an Iranian drone strike in Kuwait, 07 March 2026, at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.
