What is the linkage between right-wing populist parties in Europe and support for Ukraine or Russia? Is there anything distinct about the views of Reform UK voters on defence and foreign policy issues? New public opinion polling research by Francesco Rigoli explores the psychology of populism and security.
The war between Ukraine and Russia has placed defence and security concerns at the centre of political debate across Europe. But what does the public think about the conflict? And to what extent is public opinion divided? One potential source of division lies between supporters of right-wing populist parties and supporters of more traditional parties, which I refer to here as centrist parties (these include all parties outside the right-wing populist camp, including those on the far left and the more traditional right). While many European governments have advocated strong military, financial, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine, several right-wing populist leaders (such as Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán) have favoured diplomatic solutions or reduced involvement in the conflict. These disagreements among political elites may reflect a broader ideological divide within the public.
There are at least two reasons why right-wing populists may be less willing to support Ukraine. First, right-wing populism typically emphasises prioritising the interests of one’s own nation over international concerns. Consequently, aid to Ukraine may be perceived by right-wing populists as imposing unacceptable economic, political, or security costs on domestic citizens. Second, right-wing populists may be more tolerant of Russia’s illiberal and traditionalist political system, making them less inclined to view Russia as a threat that must be strongly opposed. To examine these possibilities, I conducted three empirical studies.
Study 1: European right-wing populists and Ukraine
In Study 1, I analysed data from the 2024 Eurobarometer survey, which included more than 30,000 participants from across Europe. Because the Eurobarometer did not directly measure support for right-wing populist parties, I used attitudes toward immigration as a proxy. This approach is justified by the fact that opposition to immigration is widely recognised as a defining feature of right-wing populist movements. Accordingly, anti-immigration sentiment was treated as an indicator of right-wing populism, whereas more favourable attitudes toward immigration were interpreted as reflecting centrist orientations. Support for Ukraine was measured using participants’ views on a range of policies, including economic sanctions against Russia, military and financial assistance to Ukraine, humanitarian aid, and the acceptance of refugees fleeing the war.
The results are illustrated in figure 1, which displays countries where people reporting anti-immigration attitude are less supportive of Ukraine compared to people reporting pro-immigration views – the darker the colour, the stronger the difference. The figure shows that this effect is present in every country included in the survey, providing strong evidence that attitudes associated with right-wing populism are linked to lower levels of support for Ukraine across Europe.
Notably, Italy is one of the countries where this effect is particularly pronounced. This is striking because, despite leading a right-wing populist party, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has remained relatively committed to supporting Ukraine. The finding suggests that Meloni’s stance on the war may be more closely aligned with that of her political opponents than with the preferences of her own voters.
Figure 1: Index reflecting the divide between right-wing populist voters and other voters in their support for Ukraine
Study 2: Reform UK supporters and Ukraine
Study 2 explored this phenomenon further by focusing on the United Kingdom. Supporters of Reform UK were classified as right-wing populists because the party represents the most prominent right-wing populist force in contemporary British politics.
In a new representative sample of the British population collected in November 2025, 300 respondents were asked an open-ended question about what the British government should do regarding the war in Ukraine. Their responses were categorised into three groups: support for Ukraine, promotion of peace negotiations, and disengagement from the conflict. The findings (see figure 2) showed that Reform UK supporters were significantly more likely than supporters of other parties to favour either a diplomatic settlement or British disengagement, rather than continued support for Ukraine.
I also examined whether supporters of other political parties differed from one another in their views. Excluding Reform UK supporters, I found no statistically significant differences among Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green voters. This suggests that the principal political divide regarding the war in Ukraine is not between the traditional left and right, but rather between supporters of right-wing populism and supporters of all other major political parties.
Figure 2: Supporters of UK political parties and their preferences for UK policy towards Ukraine
Study 3: Reform UK supporters on Russia, war and military spending
In Study 3, I sought to understand why Reform UK supporters are less willing to support Ukraine. Using a new representative sample of the British population collected in December 2025 including 300 participants, I measured attitudes toward the war alongside several potential explanatory factors, including internationalism, tolerance of war, attitudes toward the Russian regime, and views on military spending.
Consistent with the findings of Study 2, Reform UK supporters were more likely to favour either a diplomatic solution or British disengagement rather than continued military support for Ukraine. My analyses identified two key factors underlying this pattern (see figure 3). First, support for a diplomatic settlement was partly explained by a more favourable view of the Russian regime. Compared to supporters of other parties, Reform UK supporters expressed greater tolerance of Russia’s political system, which in turn made them more inclined to favour negotiations rather than continued support for Ukraine.
Second, support for disengagement was partly explained by lower levels of internationalism—that is, a stronger tendency to prioritise the interests of one’s own citizens over those of people in other countries. Reform UK supporters were more likely to believe that the British government should focus primarily on the interests of British citizens (see figure 3), and this belief contributed to their preference for staying out of the conflict altogether.
Interestingly, the reluctance of Reform UK supporters to back Ukraine was not explained by pacifism or opposition to defence spending. On the contrary, they reported greater acceptance of war in general and were more supportive of military spending than supporters of other parties (see figure 3). If anything, these characteristics would be expected to increase support for Ukraine, but this was not the case for Reform UK supporters.
Why, then, are they relatively in favour of increasing military spending? While my research does not address this question directly, one possible explanation is that their support for higher defence expenditure is driven primarily by nationalist considerations. In other words, they may favour greater military spending to strengthen Britain’s ability to defend itself and advance its national interests, rather than to assist other countries (like Ukraine) or to become more involved in international conflicts.
In conclusion, these observations suggest that Reform UK supporters’ lower willingness to help Ukraine stems primarily from their greater tolerance of the Russian regime and their stronger emphasis on national interests rather than from a general opposition to military action or defence expenditure.
Figure 3: UK political party supporters and their attitudes to selected foreign policy issues
Conclusion
Taken together, the three studies provide consistent evidence that right-wing populism is associated with reduced support for Ukraine. This pattern emerges across Europe, and the United Kingdom is no exception. Compared with supporters of centrist parties, right-wing populists are more likely to favour either a rapid diplomatic settlement to the conflict or the withdrawal of their country’s involvement altogether. This appears to map closely the preferences of the Trump administration in the United States as it tries to extricate itself from Ukraine.
My findings suggest that two factors are especially important in explaining this divide. First, right-wing populists tend to hold more favourable views of Russia’s political system, making them more receptive to diplomatic solutions and less inclined to support continued efforts to counter Russia through military assistance to Ukraine. Second, they place greater emphasis on national interests and are therefore more likely to view support for Ukraine as a costly foreign commitment that may not serve the interests of their own citizens.
In general, understanding public opinion on the war in Ukraine and, more broadly, on contemporary security and defence issues is of critical importance. An open public debate in which different positions can be expressed, discussed, and evaluated is essential for democratic participation and helps policy-makers make decisions that reflect public preferences. This is particularly important given the growing centrality of defence issues in political debate, which makes sustained public engagement in discussions about British defence increasingly necessary.
The views and opinions expressed in posts on the Rethinking Security blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the network and its broader membership.
Image Credit: Lauren Hurley / No 10 Downing Street via Flickr. Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer gives a red carpet welcome to Downing Street for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 07 June 2026.
