The crisis over Greenland marks the greatest possibility of rupture in trans-Atlantic relations since NATO’s foundation. Ian Davis considers how European states might respond to US sanctions and potential annexation of Greenland, arguing that planning should start now for a post-NATO security architecture in Europe and the Arctic.
On 17 January, US President Donald Trump threatened to impose additional tariffs on imports from eight European countries, further ramping up his campaign to acquire Greenland for the United States, by hook or by crook. The eight—Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom—will from 01 February face an extra 10% tariff on top of those already imposed in August last year, rising to 25% from 01 June, if no deal has been reached for the United States to buy the self-governing Danish territory.
All eight had recently deployed small numbers of troops to Greenland in a gesture of solidarity, following Trump’s initial threats to seize the island.
To be clear, Trump’s security-based justification – that the United States needs to possess Greenland in order to prevent China or Russia from seizing it – does not hold water. The US has at least 128 overseas military bases without owning the land they stand on, and has had a strategic military presence in Greenland since World War II. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a Russian or Chinese military presence off Greenland’s coast. Adding to the widespread scepticism, in a letter to Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Trump even implied that chagrin over not receiving the Nobel Peace Prize was part of the reason for his aggressive stance.
Europe has so far failed to seriously challenge Trump out of fear of the consequences. But Europe is already well equipped to stand firm against the bully in the White House. This does not require a ‘military showdown’ with the United States but the early and visible application of European leverage in relation to trade, market access, technology, regulatory cooperation and industrial and security partnerships. EU-US interdependencies work both ways.
As Fabian Zuleeg of the European Policy Centre argues, “If Washington moves on Greenland – or pursues similar acts of coercion – there must be costs. Not symbolic gestures, but measures that resonate domestically in the US and hurt Trump and his policy choices where it matters most: with his political base. Greenland is Europe’s credibility litmus test”.
It won’t be painless, butEurope must be prepared to take some short-term economic and security hits to raise the political, economic and alliance costs of unilateral US action and to convince President Trump to back down from his reckless path.
In this article I set out some of the steps that Europe (ideally the EU, UK and European NATO), together with other like-minded democratic states, could initiate today to defend their own interests and values.
Europe’s Spartacus moment
First and foremost, this should be Europe’s Spartacus moment, with the EU and the other 20 non-sanctioned EU member states publicly declaring their support for Greenland’s sovereignty and the actions taken by the sanctioned-eight.
While a similar move within or by NATO is made difficult by US membership and the weak pro-Trump leadership of the Secretary General, European states could still coordinate a diplomatic response by requesting consultations within the North Atlantic Council under Article 4. They should demand explanations from the United States, raise concerns about violations of international law and press for clarity over how the United States will respect the political choices of Greenland.
Europe should also call on democratic allies around the world, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, as well as non-aligned democracies (such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa), to stand with it on this issue.
European countermeasures
A second set of European responses should be for the EU and its member states to announce their own graduated countermeasures to show that, if necessary, Europe is willing to take on the White House in a long game of attrition. The following steps and timeline are suggested as openers for European dialogue rather than a polished strategy. A key principle is that any retaliatory action, whether political, military or financial, needs to be targeted and proportionate to what the Trump administration does. The measures should also allow political space for pauses to allow dialogue and potential reversal to the status quo, but only if the countermeasures bring about the required policy correction or concessions on the part of the Trump administration.
Round one
If US tariffs are applied on 01 February, the European Parliament’s trade committee should postpone implementation of the EU-US trade deal signed in August 2025. European states should also immediately suspend some other cooperation with the United States targeting areas where the US values interoperability, intelligence or burden-sharing. For example, European intelligence agencies could announce a temporary review or suspension of real-time data sharing or other support concerning shared threats, such as Islamist terrorism networks or proliferation activities. This might include reigning-in the kind of “unwavering support” given by the UK to the US in the seizure of the Russian-flagged tanker the M/V Bella. Scheduled major high-profile joint exercises with US forces that are set to take place in the following six months could also be cancelled or postponed, and temporary restrictions or delays could be placed on the expansion, resupply or rotation of US troops based in Europe. Finally, consideration should be given to pulling European teams out of US-based sporting events, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup. This is a prestige event for Trump and the threat of empty seats, loss of revenue and prestige on the global stage would be hugely embarrassing.
Round two
If tariffs are increased on 01 June, or other coercive measures are applied by the White House to further escalate the situation, Europe should trigger the EU’s anti-coercion instrument— known as the ‘trade bazooka’— that would allow the bloc to hit the US with tariffs, trade restrictions, foreign investment bans and other penalties. A smart and targeted way to get to economic interests very close to Trump and his key business supporters and ‘base’, while minimizing the direct impact on the European economy would be to apply fines or bans against US tech companies like Google, Meta and X operating in Europe. Weaning the European economy off US tech would be painful in the short term—as it was diversifying from Russian gas supplies—but would have long-term economic and security benefits.
In addition, European states should announce a review of all bilateral defence cooperation agreements with Washington with a view to potential cancellation or amendment. This is an effective way to communicate both the benefits that the US enjoys currently from good relations with Europe, and the risks it takes in pursuing the take-over of Greenland. Joint defence procurement and industrial cooperation, such as specific elements of the joint missile defence architecture planning where European nations are contributing funds or specific technologies, could also be suspended by European states.
Finally, planned purchases of specific high-cost weapon systems, such as the F-35, could be cancelled in favour of European alternatives. Cancelling these contracts will also have economic consequences, including job losses in Europe. This is because many of the contracts with US military companies include joint production with European companies or offset arrangements whereby US aerospace and military companies invest directly or indirectly in the economy of the purchasing state. But these losses could be minimalised or even surpassed by a compensatory ‘buy European’ policy or by redirecting some of the savings into the non-military sectors of European states. However, the US economy would take the bigger hit. US aerospace and defence sector generates over a trillion dollars in economic activity annually, supporting over 2.5 million US jobs and is particularly vulnerable to cuts in orders. In the 12 months up to June 2023, European countries spent over $52 billion on weapons provided by US defence companies.
The possible end of NATO and a new European security structure
If the Trump administration goes ahead and annexes or invades Greenland, European states should consider:
- Terminating NATO and immediately forming a European Treaty Organisation (ETO), perhaps with Canada as an Associate Member.
- Establishing a European court under the authority of the Council of Europe to prosecute President Trump and the other American leaders who orchestrate the act of aggression. Such an ad hoc tribunal—similar to the proposed Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine—would be the best available option to try a crime of aggression, for which the International Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction.
- Applying individual sanctions on a wide range of US government officials and broad sanctions against the US economy, as well as seizing assets in Europe belonging to the Trump family.
On the future of NATO, Trump himself has acknowledged it could be a “choice” between preserving the alliance or acquiring Greenland. The Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has already warned that the latter would spell the end of NATO. A phased takeover by ETO of the European-based organs, staff, activities and infrastructure of NATO could be initiated and all US bases within Europe would be given notice to close.
With Europeans also currently defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russia a legitimate question arises as to whether Europe can credibly reconcile that reality and a simultaneous break with the United States. While it remains possible for Europe to undertake both challenges in the short-term, it adds even further impetus to reaching a just peace settlement in the Russia-Ukraine war. Part of that settlement could be an open door to future Russian membership of ETO, since one of Moscow’s key stated reasons for starting the war was its exclusion from the European security order. Russian membership of ETO would, of course, depend on the outcome of the war and Moscow’s willingness to accept that European stability and security is centred on democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.
Trump might seek to undermine an ETO by offering new bilateral security deals to right/populist governments in Europe, as well as to more centrist governments in East European states that feel most threatened by Russia, with support for increased military spending and even major subcontracting for weapon systems. The Franco-German core and the position of Poland and the UK will thus be crucial in maintaining the idea of collective European security without kowtowing to competing US interests.
As regards the UK, the question arises as to whether Westminster can be weaned off its so-called ‘special relationship’ with Washington. The UK’s sovereignty is already deeply compromised, from its dependence on the US to maintain its nuclear arsenal (perceived as critical to its security) to the US tech industry’s grip over every part of British lives. This now needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency and decisions taken that prioritise UK independence over access to US technology.
Stand with progressive Americans
Finally, Europe should also stand with Americans who dream of a better future, like Jacob Frey, the mayor of Minneapolis. America is not synonymous with President Trump, the Republican party or the Big Tech oligarchs. Rather, the United States is embodied by its 335 million citizens, most of whom (including many of the 77 million who voted for Trump) just want to live in a civilised world, and in a country where freedom and human rights are respected and upheld by credible independent institutions, both domestic and international.
While formal federal power is in the hands of Trump and his inner circle, many Americans remain ready to assert their rights and constitutional traditions. Domestic democratic opposition to Trump is growing, despite the likelihood of coming under attack over the next three years. European governments, institutions and civil society organisations should make it clear that they stand with this segment of Americans that still dreams of a better America and its place in the world. Indeed, this would be a quid pro quo for the Trump administration’s avowed wish to grow Europe’s right-wing populist movement.
From collective to common security
In conclusion, much has been written about the inability of Europe to mount a defence of the continent without the United States, but such views are based on outdated or misplaced notions of what security really is and how it can be achieved, and more significantly, an under-appreciated US threat under Trump. Part of the reason that the Trump administration has been able to get away with everything it has done this past year is because countries have not come together to wield their collective pressure to stop it. This must now change.
And even if the if US doesn’t attack Greenland, some argue that Europe’s best chance of surviving as a free and open continent in an imperial world is to force the rupture with the United States anyway. While there is certainly a case for a recalibration of relations with the United States, the finality applied by a ‘rupture’ does not allow for the future possibility of working with non-Trump Americans on a new statement of values and rules for championing peace, stability and justice.
While transforming the security cord with America, Europe could begin to forge a new ETO organisation more explicitly limited in scope to defensive operations. This would be an interim step in the transition from collective towards common security on the continent, an opportunity that had great promise in the early 1990s but was ignored by leaderships at the time. Europe is now at the crossroads. There is an opportunity to move (back) towards an OSCE-like cooperative view of Europe, with the US involved as a key interested party in European security, but not in a position of institutionalised hegemony.
Dr Ian Davis is Director of NATO Watch, a Scottish Charitable Incorporated Organisation that works to promote public awareness and foster debate on the role of NATO in public life. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of NATO Watch, its trustees or associates, or any other organization with which the author is connected.
The views and opinions expressed in posts on the Rethinking Security blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the network and its broader membership.
Image Credit: Wikipedia. The map shows Greenland (in Green) with contributing states to Operation Arctic Endurance, the January 2026 Danish-led military exercise in Greenland, in dark blue, other NATO member states in light blue, and the United States in red, all as of 20 Jan 2026.
Where is Starlink in this scenario?
If Starlink suddenly became unavailable across Europe, the immediate impact would be severe for Ukraine’s military operations—potentially grounding drones, disrupting command, and enabling Russian advances—but limited for most European civilian and military users, who have alternatives, though tactical gaps would emerge in select areas.