On 13 September 2024, the British International Studies Association’s new Security Policy and Practice working group hosted a ‘Dialogue on the UK Government’s Strategic Defence Review’, supported by Rethinking Security. Over 50 scholars, plus experts working with parliamentary committees, NGOs and think tanks, joined the session. This article captures key points from the discussion while respecting the Chatham House Rule.

By Larry Attree, Dr Thomas Martin and Dr Eli Schweiger

On 16 July, new Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer commissioned a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Led by Lord Robertson, Dr Fiona Hill and General Sir Richard Barron, the SDR aims ‘to make Britain secure at home and strong abroad’. Its Terms of Reference signals concerns over conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, states that challenge stability and UK values/interests, terrorism, hybrid attacks and climate change. Reviewers are considering inter alia threats, capabilities, human resources, growth, value for money, modernisation, evolving technology and net zero ambitions.

One apparent intention of the review is to strike a reassuring note on policy continuity. Non-negotiable parameters include commitments to the UK’s nuclear weapons, AUKUS, NATO and Ukraine, while the review will look at how to maintain ties with allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the Gulf and the Middle East. The intention to increase defence spend to 2.5% of GDP is restated but a decision on this reserved ‘until a future fiscal event’.

Submissions are invited until the end of September (from ‘serving and retired members of the Armed Forces, the defence industry, the general public, academics, Parliament, and our closest allies and partners, especially in NATO’). There is a portal for submitting responses to a set of ‘propositions’ – and the review team has also solicited inputs from teams within government and from selected experts.

The SDR report is expected in the first quarter of 2025, and Parliamentary bodies such as the Defence Select Committee (once reconstituted in October) are likely to conduct their own enquiries as well as scrutinise recommendations adopted by the Government.

Although the Review offers scope to consider broader issues underlying instability and human insecurity, and opportunities to contribute positively to international and human security, with appropriate divisions of labour between defence and other tools, the Review singles out defence from the more integrated look at wider foreign and security policy issues attempted by previous governments under the ‘Integrated Review’ (2021) and its ‘Refresh’ (2023).

Most of the 23 ‘propositions’ circulated by reviewers for input seek detail in predetermined directions, for example:

  • Propose how UK Defence’s contribution to NATO should be enhanced as a driving requirement of capability and activity, including through prioritising defence export potential
  • Propose how UK Defence acquisition and support (for all classes of equipment) continues to modernise to: maintain pace with key technology, enable the transition to an integrated force, advance interoperability in NATO, and deliver agile, cost-effective acquisition and support at optimum value for money.
  • Propose the digital enablement required by an Integrated Force across all domains and to recommend and prioritise the steps to accelerate this transformation to place UK Defence as a global pacesetter in this area.

Thus the Review is clearly looking for improvements in priority areas – such as support for NATO, Ukraine, and other allies, and achieving domestic resilience – and hoping to detail how to become more modern and integrated in a cost-effective way – rather than pushing for much new strategic thinking or emphasising how defence connects to wider policy and strategic issues. The language of the propositions is clearly inviting for insiders versed in the relevant terminology – but is likely to intimidate outsiders, increasing the risk that defence policy will remain in the hands of a narrow subset of people. This is a marked contrast to the more inviting and participatory approach taken, for example, in neighbouring Ireland.

In this sense, most participants expressed concerns that the SDR has been designed in a narrow, conservative way. It ignores the opportunity to revisit the previous government’s foreign policy vision under the Integrated Review and Refresh; it eschews a national conversation over issues related to nuclear deterrence despite the limited public debate such issues have enjoyed in recent decades and the significant risks and problems in this area; and it offers little entry point for reflection on defence experiences which should prompt lesson-learning – such as reflections on counter-terror and stabilisation efforts to which the UK has contributed in the Sahel. Reflecting male dominance in the sector, only 2 of the 9 reviewers are women, and they are mostly drawn from MoD, NATO or defence industry backgrounds.

At the same time, Lord Robertson’s call for ‘frankness about the choices before us’ hints at some openness to critical engagement – for example, there may be value in pointing out the risks of the Review’s parameters as specified by the Government.

Some of the Review’s specific propositions do offer scope to introduce evidence and arguments in relation to related issues such as human security, conflict prevention, peacebuilding/peacekeeping, equality, rights, gender, peace and security, protection of civilians and civilian harm reduction. For example:

  • Describe the strategic, threat, and operational context for UK Defence 2024-2050.
  • Propose, in order of priority, the roles UK Defence must be capable of fulfilling 2024-2040.
  • Describe how existing UK Defence capability and the current 10-year programme match the demands of the roles and capabilities identified for 2024-2040, highlighting and prioritising critical gaps.
  • Describe what advancing UK Defence from a multi-domain to an integrated force concept means and identify the key characteristics of each, including the relationship with non-kinetic means and resources.
  • Propose how UK Defence can build relationships with allies, partners and alliances as a strategic strength for the UK.

Responding to such propositions in a way that clarifies the links between defence and wider issues, as well as highlighting the potential mismatch between assumed objectives and actual military capabilities, might be welcomed by those insiders who are concerned over the relatively narrow, military focus of the SDR.

Although consultation can sometimes feel tokenistic, several of the event participants flagged the value of providing inputs to processes such as this SDR – which do not always draw the expected conclusions. Although critical perspectives may not be taken up immediately, it is important that research and analysis enters the public record whether or not it accords with the state’s approach. Critical ideas, evidence and warnings are often borne out, and gain wider acceptance over time, and it is vital to flag perspectives on race, gender and class that are only slowly being voiced within defence policy communities.

Expert, practitioner and academic insights can prove influential because those within government often have tight parameters and limited capacity to think creatively on policy issues. Multiple submissions that coalesce around alternative perspectives are harder to ignore, and credible evidence from outsiders can help insiders with internal battles. Exerting influence can be a cumulative process – by consistently making submissions, academics and other experts can spread awareness of their expertise, leading to invitations to give evidence and contribute to future consultations, events and processes. There is likewise inherent value in engaging with and strengthening transparency and accountability processes on security policy. The SDR’s 500 word limit for responses per proposition also enables respondents to say more than has sometimes been the case in similar past exercises.

The Review team and Parliamentarians/committees value expert insights on the pros and cons of different options, especially those that are backed by credibly referenced evidence and offered from a unique perspective or standpoint. In recent times, the volume of submissions has at times meant a layer of sifting inputs via AI. This underlines the value of clearly signposting arguments and key points made in submissions via subheadings, bold text, and so on.

While the SDR does have narrow parameters, it is worth noting that there are a number of other foreign and development policy reviews currently in progress, on the UK’s global impact, the development-diplomacy model and economic diplomacy – to keep up with these, sign up to Parliament Knowledge Exchange. Likewise, especially where the formal process feels closed, publishing op-eds with relevant media and think tanks that enrich the conversation around formal processes such as the SDR can be a highly effective way to inform the public and policy community about relevant risks, opportunities and options.

Despite these notes of encouragement, overall, the wide range of UK security experts who joined this discussion were clearly concerned by the framing of the SDR. Nonetheless, many were determined to find ways to engage to ensure their evidence and analysis is on the record and has the potential to help further open the window towards open-minded, well-informed and holistically considered UK defence and security policy. BISA will continue to convene discussions for those interested in engaging with these issues and the outcomes of the SDR, and Rethinking Security is open to amplifying evidence and insights on these topics from scholars and other experts.

The co-authors of this blog are also the co-conveners of the new BISA Security Policy and Practice group.

Larry Attree is Rethinking Security’s Academic Outreach Coordinator and an independent consultant.

Dr Thomas Martin is Lecturer in International Studies at the Open University.

Dr Elisabeth Schweiger is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Stirling.

The views and opinions expressed in posts on the Rethinking Security blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the network and its broader membership.

Image Credit: Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street via Flickr. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and John Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, meet Lord Robertson, newly appointed head of Government’s Strategic Defence Review in 10 Downing Street, 16 July 2024.

Published by larryattree

Larry Attree is a globally recognized expert on peace, conflict, and security issues. Former Head of Global Policy and Advocacy at Saferworld, he has more than two decades of experience and has influenced global agreements on peace, governance, and development themes, including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, the Busan Partnership, and the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. As architect of Saferworld’s peacebuilding responses to crises and threats program, Larry authored and edited numerous studies on stabilization, statebuilding, counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, peace, human rights, security, justice, and development. He has a long track record in peace, rights, and security strategy and in program design, management, training and evaluation, conflict research and analysis, high-level policy advice, advocacy, and coalition building. He has lived and worked for peace in the Balkans, South Asia, Africa, and the Pacific with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Saferworld and others. Larry currently supports Rethinking Security on academic outreach.

3 thoughts on “Does the new Government’s Strategic Defence Review offer a window for rethinking UK defence policy?”

  2. Especially valuable is Larry et alios’ subtle observation of the SDR as a defence matter singularised vis-à-vis the present war in Europe (which I take as presently costing the UK more than its annual schools budget when all factors are taken into account). On the question as to the SDR offering a window for rethinking UK Defence policy the article is percipient on the problem of blinds already drawn obscuring the prospect of inquiry into the UK’s strategic interest beyond the immediate war in Europe and its geopolitical implications. In this regard, the SDR proffers an invitation to concur in detail with the present popular enthusiasm for tactical engagements at the fighting front. These serve up selectively a carefully propagandised narrative for protracting yet another war in Europe, seemingly committed to extending the 1m+ Russian and Ukrainian casualties while making permanent 8m displaced Ukrainians. Obscured are the twofold tactical advantages of: 1) disposing of obsolescent materiel and the concomitant politics of budgetary desiderata welded ‘beneficially’ to respective arms industries and military promotions; together with 2) evaluative intelligence garnered from the disposition and disposal of NATO derived materiel in action, albeit mirrored to the benefit of the Sino-Russian et al bloc.
    The article touches (carefully) on and gives expression to the problem of strategic opacity in a review seemingly inviting supporting argument (rationale) for a UK defence mission dedicated to its role as an arm of the USA’s global geopolitical drive to debilitate the Sino-Russian et al bloc, albeit actually providing a rational drive for the formation, consolidation and extension of that bloc, and the emergence of a RUBIS III and de-dollarisation. The article also rightly proffers the wider point that the SDR invitation:
    … eschews a national conversation over issues related to nuclear deterrence despite the limited public debate such issues have enjoyed in recent decades and the significant risks and problems in this area; and it offers little entry point for reflection on defence experiences which should prompt lesson-learning – such as reflections on counter-terror and stabilisation efforts to which the UK has contributed in the Sahel. Reflecting male dominance in the sector, only 2 of the 9 reviewers are women, and they are mostly drawn from MoD, NATO or defence industry backgrounds.
    Overall, the SDR seems already committed to forwarding the USA’s war in Europe. The article does not point out that the USA’s commitment is certainly only to the war being in Europe. The USA, irrespective of which President, is certainly intent that Europe’s ‘defence’ is increasingly funded by its European participants. The article does not address that the USA’s North Atlantic Treaty Organisation can, and is in any case, oriented globally to project the USA’s geopolitical power into the China Seas and related waters.
    Perhaps the SDR might prove more an SOR, Strategic Offence Review. Can it be that Russia (which is to say, the demonised Putin) intends to invade Europe and take it over by force? Or will Russia (sorry, Putin) tenaciously defend its Crimean tendon, its Achilles Heel, until ministered by diplomatic salving from the prospect of the USA’s NATO installing medium-range (2,000kms) ground-to-ground (SSMs/GGMs, even the new LRHW) missile launchers in Crimea, or harboured in Sevastopol with the USA’s ‘Mediterranean fleet’? Moscow sits 1,500kms and St Petersburg 2,000kms, while the raw nerve of 1943 Kursk and Hitler’s Operation Citadel is touched today as the war completes its 3rd year. At present such an operational capability lies not within the USA’s NATO armoury as such, but can be quickly ‘evolved’ from presently available medium range nuclear capable missiles. Thus, the USA’s NATO could deploy for ‘European protection’ such as Israeli Jericho 2/3s or extended range SCUDs. This would transform the MAD deterrence framework as it presently stands, leaving ‘Minuteman’ et al capabilities siloed or submarined as at present outside Europe, except that of the submerged ICBMs of France and the UK. In this regard, a nuclear war with Russia might be properly (carefully) confined by the USA to being proxy fought in Europe; proxy wars being the USA’s preferred mode of domination.
    As to nuclear non-proliferation, apart from AUKUS ‘legalising’ proliferation of weapons grade enriched uranium HEU, September’s edition of ‘Arms Control Today’ helpfully roams the hinterland of worry in this regard. One can only wonder what Denis would have made of his name-sake’s enthusiasm for (yet) another war in Europe.
    Thank you Larry et alios for a stimulating piece.

    Reply

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