The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency undermines efforts to tackle urgent global security risks such as nuclear weapons and climate change. Dr Stuart Parkinson gives an overview of the problems and assesses how best to respond.
Global risks have been increasing for years. To name but some of the most extreme are the climate crisis, the potential for nuclear war, the breaching of numerous planetary boundaries, the increase in extreme inequality and poverty, the growing number of ‘conventional’ wars, disruptive technologies, and disease pandemics. Most, if not all, have a security dimension.
There’s plenty of evidence that the election of Donald Trump as US president for the second time will undermine progress in tackling virtually all of these.
This article focuses on two leading examples – the risk of nuclear war and the climate crisis – to highlight both the threats from Trump and the numerous opportunities to blunt his negative impact. One key element is the role of scientific community.
Nuclear war
The risk of nuclear war has increased markedly since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, despite having largely dropped out of the headlines after the end of the Cold War, the threat from nuclear weapons had not disappeared. The United States and Russia each continued to keep hundreds of nuclear weapons on high alert – a status known officially as ‘launch on warning’ – which meant that their missiles could be fired as little as 20 minutes after receiving an alert. The potential for human or technical errors leading to an attack was a major concern – and that risk is heightened today.
While some hope that the risks of nuclear Armageddon will be reduced by Trump’s professed desire to end the war in Ukraine by reducing or halting US military support to that country, there is every reason to be sceptical. Four key factors are: Trump’s disdain for arms control agreements; Trump’s intention to increase US military spending, including on nuclear weapons; Trump’s erratic behaviour; and Putin’s willingness to take military risks to expand Russia’s interests.
During his first term in office, Trump withdrew the United States from three nuclear arms control treaties. First was the Iran nuclear deal. Agreed in 2015, it restricted Iran’s nuclear programmes in return for relief from international trade sanctions. Next, Trump pulled the United States out of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had banned nuclear-armed missiles of ranges between 500 and 5,500km from being deployed in Europe. The third agreement was the Open Skies Treaty, which allowed nations to carry out surveillance flights over each others’ territories to verify compliance with arms control agreements.
While all these treaties had their flaws, Trump’s strategy of dismantling arms agreements rather than looking for ways to improve them is highly dangerous. For example, the demise of the INF Treaty opened the door for Russia to develop a new, intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Oreshnik. A non-nuclear-armed version of this missile was launched against Ukraine in November, in yet another escalation of the war.
Under threat during a second Trump term are New START and the CTBT. New START limits the number of ‘strategic’ nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and Russia to 1,550. It is the only remaining treaty preventing a major new nuclear arms race between the two nations which hold nearly 90% of the world’s warheads, and it is due to expire in 2026. The CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – bans all test explosions of nuclear weapons. While it has not legally ‘entered into force’, all nations apart from North Korea have abided by the ban since 1998.[i]
A decision by Trump to ‘unsign’ the treaty and restart US nuclear testing – as part of so-called ‘nuclear modernisation’ programmes – would not only fuel a more widespread and highly dangerous nuclear arms race, it would rapidly increase radioactive pollution of the atmosphere. Indeed, during this first term, Trump ordered the development and deployment of “more usable” nuclear weapons – and could again undermine international norms during his second term. Indeed, Trump’s pick for Defence Secretary, Pete Hesgeth, is a hardline militarist who seems to have been chosen exactly for this reason.
Compounding the dismantling of nuclear arms control treaties is antagonistic and unpredictable behaviour by the leaders of nuclear-armed states – in particular, Trump and Putin. This raises the risk of misunderstanding and miscommunication that could lead to nuclear launches. One respected survey of nuclear weapons history showed that, over a 40-year period (1962-2002), incidents of ‘near nuclear use’ occurred every three years on average due to human or technical error.
Global military spending has already reached a massive $2.4 trillion – the highest level ever recorded – with the United States spending more than the next nine spenders combined, including China and Russia. Trump’s policies will likely expand this markedly – including for nuclear programmes – fuelling arms races across the world. Trump may think that the United States can ‘win’ any international arms race – nuclear or conventional – but these races are very expensive and destabilising, and his country is already facing numerous economic problems.
There is a range of international action that can be taken to reduce nuclear risks. Improving dialogue and negotiation between the nuclear-armed states is critical. In this regard, recent agreement between the G20 nations on this issue is very important. The group’s 2023 statement said that “the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible” and six of the nine nuclear-armed nations were signatories – including the United States and Russia.
Expanding the policy of ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons – which is currently pursued and promoted by China – would also be very helpful in reducing tensions.
Regular military-to-military communication is also important to reduce the risks of misunderstandings during military activities.
De-escalation measures by other nuclear-armed states could also make a significant difference. For example, the UK could halt the planned return of US nuclear weapons to its soil, reverse the recent increase in its warhead stockpile, and return to the open declaration of its number of warheads.
More nations could and should sign and ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). 94 states have signed the treaty to date.
Improved co-operation on other issues – such as environmental protection or scientific research – can help also increase trust between nations at a broader level, which could have a positive effect on security dialogues. Indeed, the planned new UN study on the impacts of a potential nuclear war offers an opportunity for greater understanding among policy-makers and the public of the civilisation-ending threat that nuclear weapons pose.
More broadly, it is important for nations to resist calls for increased military spending – and instead use the funding to tackle the roots of global insecurity, including supporting the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Again, the role of campaigners in keeping up the pressure on governments is essential.
The climate crisis
Global climate change is already reaching critical levels. Climate scientists estimate that global carbon emissions will likely exceed the level necessary to breach the 1.5°C temperature target – as specified in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (PCA) – as early as 2027. Climate change-induced extreme weather is already wreaking havoc around the world – in the form of heatwaves, droughts, wildfires, major storms, floods, and crop failures – and things are set to get much worse. The probability is growing that we will soon pass critical ‘climate tipping points’, where change becomes rapid and irreversible. This includes die-back of the world’s coral reefs and the Amazon rainforest, melting of major ice sheets, and changes to major ocean currents. The impacts will be felt most acutely by the most vulnerable human communities, and are already contributing to a mass extinction of animals and plants.
Trump – a self-confessed climate denier – is therefore one of the last people the world needs as president of the world’s largest economy right now. His policies include withdrawing the United States from the PCA and dismantling national low carbon energy programmes. He supports an expansion of oil production in areas like the Alaskan Arctic, and a resumption of US exports of high-carbon liquified natural gas. New tariffs on imported goods are likely to push up the prices of low carbon technologies such as solar panels. His pick for Energy Secretary is Chris Wright, an oil and gas industry executive who endorses Trump’s extreme views and policies.
However, Trump will still face significant obstacles in trying to derail the low carbon transition now underway in the United States, let alone internationally
- Competitiveness of renewables
Let’s start with energy. US coal use has been falling rapidly since its peak in 2007, due to poor economics and less polluting alternatives. Even during Trump’s first term, consumption fell 25%,[ii] despite his claims to support the industry. The latest data shows that consumption has fallen 55% below the peak. Likewise, US electricity generation from renewable sources expanded 34% despite Trump’s lack of support during his first term.[iii] Again, this growth followed the overarching trend, with cost playing a critical factor. The favourable economics of especially wind and solar power – with an increasing role for energy storage technologies – is improving year by year, meaning fossil fuels are likely to be replaced even more rapidly in future years.
2. State and local activism
Indeed, much climate-related policy is decided and implemented at state level in the United States, and hence Trump’s ability to interfere will be even more limited. 23 states – representing over 50% of the US population – now have carbon reduction targets, with most aiming for net zero emissions by 2050 at the latest. President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act put in place many support mechanisms for climate action, creating large numbers of jobs, so states that have benefitted are likely to oppose these changes both within Congress and through the courts.
3. Price impacts of tariffs
Trump’s plans to bring in tariffs for imported goods are likely to have mixed effects on climate action. While there are justified concerns that these will slow the uptake of cleaner technologies such as solar panels and electric vehicles, there is widespread agreement among economists that the tariffs will lead to significant price rises for all US consumers. This will likely decrease consumption of a wide range of goods and energy use more broadly – and could well bring down carbon emissions.
4. International cooperation and action
The response of other nations to Trump’s climate-related policies will be also critical. It is essential that other major economies quickly increase co-operation over their climate-related policies and research programmes. This will, for example, help enable them to submit much more ambitious climate targets to the UN by the next deadline in February. There are numerous international alliances focused on expanding renewables, improving energy efficiency, and cutting methane emissions, fossil fuel subsidies, and deforestation. Support for these needs to be strengthened. One important aspect is to improve trade between neighbouring nations, which will help shorten supply chains and hence reduce emissions. Measures targeting fossil fuel corporations and elite polluters could yield particularly large reductions.
The COP29 climate negotiations in early November – carried out in the shadow of Trump’s election – showed that nations could still reach agreement on numerous initiatives, ranging from international climate finance to the expansion of energy storage. However, ambition is still not close to where it needs to be. Climate-friendly governments, campaigners, and scientists will need to keep up the pressure for much stronger action.
While the chances of keeping global temperature change below 1.5°C may be vanishing fast, no effort should be spared to prevent every 0.1°C rise above that target. Each fraction of a degree would still represent huge numbers of lives lost and ecosystems devastated. Indeed, it is also essential that other wealthier nations increase their funding of climate adaptation measures in vulnerable communities.
Scientific evidence
Underpinning the dangers that Trump poses for global security risks is his disdain for scientific evidence and his willingness to spread disinformation.
One especially serious concern here is that he will start to dismantle US government scientific bodies and research programmes which don’t suit his agenda. This could also interrupt data collection on key issues from health to arms control to environmental protection. During his first term, he cut funding for NASA’s satellite-based Earth observation programmes – which are important for climate change research. This time around he could end the Global Change Research Program and dismantle the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). He could also cut crucial US funding for UN bodies, such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), World Health Organisation (WHO), and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Again, it is essential for others – whether they be national governments, US bodies at the state level, or independently funded scientific organisations – to step into any voids as far as possible, whether by providing additional funds or hosting R&D programmes. We must also support individual scientists who resist attacks on evidence gathering. We cannot allow the incoming Trump government to subvert the research and data upon which robust policy-making depends.
While the situation looks grim on many fronts, there is much that can be done to reduce the negative impacts of a new Trump-led government – and the time to act is now.
[i] North Korea has not conducted any nuclear tests since September 2017.
[ii] US coal use fell by 25% between 2016 (when Trump came into office) and 2021. 2021 is used as the comparison year in order to compensate for the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
[iii] Again, these figures are for the period 2016-2021.
Dr Stuart Parkinson is Executive Director of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR). He holds a PhD in climate science and has 25 years’ experience of writing on security issues related to science and technology.
This is an updated version of an article first published by SGR on 14 November.
The views and opinions expressed in posts on the Rethinking Security blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the network and its broader membership.
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